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FOREWORD 
OH, THE TREATISE!† 
Richard A. Danner* 
Introduction 
In his foreword to the Michigan Law Review’s 2009 Survey of Books 
Related to the Law, my former Duke colleague Erwin Chemerinsky posed 
the question: “[W]hy should law professors write?”1 In answering, Erwin 
took as a starting point the well-known criticisms of legal scholarship that 
Judge Harry Edwards published in this journal in 1992.2 
Judge Edwards indicted legal scholars for failing to engage the practical 
problems facing lawyers and judges, writing instead for the benefit of schol-
ars in law and other disciplines rather than for their professional audiences.3 
He characterized “practical” legal scholarship as both prescriptive (aiming 
to instruct attorneys, judges, and other decisionmakers) and doctrinal (deal-
ing with the sources of law that constrain and guide practitioners, 
decisionmakers, and policymakers).4 Having served on the law faculties at 
Michigan and Harvard before joining the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia,5 Judge Edwards was well positioned to critique the direction 
of legal scholarship, but he is not the only judge to have done so. In recent 
years Chief Justice Roberts has made clear his opinion of most academic 
writing,6 and Justice Kennedy has pointedly expressed his concerns about 
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 1. Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: Why Write?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 881, 881 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 883–86. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between 
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992). Chemerinsky refer-
ences most of the pertinent follow-up to Judge Edwards’s article. See Chemerinsky, supra note 
1, at 884 n.8. 
 3. Edwards, supra note 2, at 42–57. 
 4. Id. at 42–43. 
 5. Judge Edwards also practiced for five years before coming to Michigan. Harry T. 
Edwards, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/ 
home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+HTE (last visited, Sept. 5, 2012). 
 6. See, e.g., Interviews with United States Supreme Court Justices—John G. Roberts 
Jr., 13 Scribes J. Legal Writing 5, 37 (2010) (“What the academy is doing, as far as I can 
tell, is largely of no use or interest to people who actually practice law. . . . [I]t doesn’t help 
the practitioners or help the judges.”).  
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the diminishing relevance of law reviews to appellate court decisionmak-
ing.7 
Edwards characterized the legal treatise as “[t]he paradigm of ‘practical’ 
legal scholarship,” and listed several “classic examples” of treatises that an-
swered his concerns.8 For Edwards, all were works that “create an 
interpretive framework; categorize the mass of legal authorities in terms of 
this framework; interpret closely the various authoritative texts within each 
category; and thereby demonstrate for judges or practitioners what ‘the law’ 
requires.”9 However, he neither discussed the individual treatises he cited 
before moving on to other matters, nor expanded on why the treatise has 
been so important to American lawyers.  
Chemerinsky eloquently defended the value of scholarship written for 
academic audiences and others beyond the judiciary and the bar,10 but 
agreed with Edwards that “doctrinal scholarship is much less valued today 
than in prior generations.”11 He noted that law professors still “continue to 
write legal treatises that describe and critique legal doctrines,”12 but also 
wondered when the editors of the Michigan Law Review had last chosen a 
casebook or legal treatise for inclusion in the annual Book Review issue.13 
                                                                                                                      
 7. 9thcirc, Justice Kennedy Speaks at the 2010 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, 
YouTube (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xeQRpNQmWOU (“It’s per-
fectly possible and feasible, it seems to me, for law review commentary immediately to come 
out with reference to important three-judge district court cases, so that we have some neutral, 
detached, critical, intellectual commentary and analysis of the case. We need that.”). 
There is some evidence that federal judges, including the justices of the Supreme Court, 
cite law review articles in their opinions, particularly in important and difficult cases. See, e.g., 
Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Use 
of Legal Scholarship, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 995 (2012). But see Brent E. Newton, Law Review 
Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First-Century Supreme Court Justices: An Empirical 
Analysis, 4 Drexel L. Rev. 399 (2012). 
 8. Edwards, supra note 2, at 43.  
 9. Id.; see also Harry T. Edwards, Another “Postscript” to “The Growing Disjunction 
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession”, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 561, 564 (1994).  
 10. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 886–90; see also Sanford Levinson, Judge Edwards’ 
Indictment of “Impractical” Scholars: The Need for a Bill of Particulars, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 
2010, 2013–14 (1993) (discussing the appropriateness of multiple audiences for legal scholar-
ship).  
 11. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 889. 
 12. Id. at 885; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 
1339 (2002) (“Doctrinal analysis . . . remains the method of choice for the vast majority of 
legal scholars.”). 
 13. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 886. In 2011, the Book Review editors included a 
review of a treatise on the law of state constitutions. See Jim Rossi, Assessing the State of 
State Constitutionalism, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1145 (2011) (reviewing Robert F. Williams, 
The Law of American State Constitutions (2009)). In 2012, Douglas Laycock reviewed 
the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. Douglas Laycock, Restoring 
Restitution to the Canon, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 929 (2012). 
In a study of citation of practice-oriented treatises in law review articles, Fred Shapiro 
noted that “[t]he best measure of the success of the treatises is probably their totals of citations 
in judicial opinions.” Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Books Published Since 1978, 29 
J. Legal Stud. 397, 404–05 (2000). 
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In the following year’s foreword to the Book Review issue, Eugene Volokh 
described how electronic-book technologies would change books related to 
the law, but he explicitly omitted from his speculations such characteristical-
ly legal publications as treatises and other books aimed at practitioners.14 
Edwards’s comments regarding the continuing value of legal treatises 
likely raised a few eyebrows. A.W.B. Simpson and Morton Horwitz had 
each already chronicled the decline of the American legal treatise,15 and 
Lawrence Friedman had written that “[m]ost 19th-century treatises were 
barren enough reading when they first appeared, and would be sheer torture 
for the reader today.”16 Friedman’s writings on American legal history have 
generally offered only grudging acknowledgement of the efforts of treatise 
writers. In 2002 he pointed out that, although doctrinal research had been 
“the heart of legal scholarship” for most of the twentieth century, even the 
highly regarded major treatises were “elephantine works” that “tied together 
vast masses of cases, giving them some kind of coherence, real or imagi-
nary.”17 Friedman also noted with apparent satisfaction that by the 1980s 
“there were law professors who actually wrote real books.”18 Most likely, 
these books were of the sort Edwards would view as being of little use to 
practitioners and judges.  
In Law Books in Action, their 2012 collection of essays devoted to the 
Anglo-American legal treatise, Angela Fernandez and Markus Dubber con-
clude that while the form remains popular in other common law countries, 
“few if any legal scholars in the United States today wake up filled with a 
burning desire to devote their professional lives to the production of a trea-
tise.”19 Yet the academy’s lack of interest in writing treatises tells us little 
about the needs of twenty-first-century lawyers and judges. Would today’s 
practicing bar benefit from more of the prescriptive and doctrinal writing 
that Edwards’s “paradigm of ‘practical’ legal scholarship” once provided?20 
This Foreword takes a historical approach to this question by reviewing the 
history of the American legal treatise through the lens of several works that 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Eugene Volokh, Foreword: The Future of Books Related to the Law?, 108 Mich. L. 
Rev. 823, 837 (2010).  
 15. See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and 
the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 632 (1981); Morton J. Horwitz, Treatise 
Literature, 69 Law Libr. J. 460, 460 (1976).  
 16. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 624 (2d ed. 1985). Later 
references to Friedman’s history are to the most recent edition. Lawrence M. Friedman, A 
History of American Law 477 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter Friedman (2005)]. 
 17. Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the 20th Century 487 (2002).  
 18. Friedman, supra note 17, at 488; Edwards, supra note 2, at 42–57. But see Carl E. 
Schneider, The Book Review Issue: An Owner’s Guide, 96 Mich. L Rev. 1363, 1367 (1998) 
(noting that “the range of legal doctrine has expanded hugely . . . . [and] widely incorporates 
ideas from other disciplines”). 
 19. Angela Fernandez & Markus D. Dubber, Introduction: Putting the Legal Treatise in 
Its Place, in Law Books in Action 1, 20–21 (Angela Fernandez & Markus D. Dubber eds., 
2012). 
 20. Edwards, supra note 2, at 43. 
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consider its place as a form of legal literature: Roscoe Pound’s lectures on 
the “formative era” of American law,21 A.W.B. Simpson’s 1981 article on 
the rise and fall of the legal treatise,22 and Fernandez and Dubber’s recent 
collection of essays on the treatise and similar forms.23 Part I examines the 
origins of the legal treatise and its early importance in the United States; 
Part II reviews the impact that the massive growth in published case law had 
on the treatise during the latter part of the nineteenth century; and Part III 
considers the implications for the treatise of shifts from print to electronic 
formats in the twentieth century. This Foreword concludes by speculating 
briefly on the continuing need for the treatise and its place in the digital le-
gal-information environment. 
I. Age of the Treatise  
Most considerations of the treatise exclude comprehensive or “institu-
tional” works such as William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England and James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, each of which 
is distinguished by its attempt “to describe the private law of an entire legal 
system in a single work.”24 In his definition of the treatise, Simpson included 
only monographs dealing with a particular substantive area of law.25 He re-
lied on characteristics suggested by T.F.T. Plucknett, who had emphasized 
the significance of the treatise’s deductive presentation of its subject and the 
prominence given to legal principles. According to Plucknett, the principles, 
once formulated, could be applied to specific questions, and the treatise 
could, “by its sheer intellectual weight . . . impose those principles upon 
teachers, students, lawyers and the courts.”26 Simpson’s approach accords 
with the definition outlined in 1868 by the prolific American treatise writer 
Joel Prentiss Bishop, who defined the treatise as “an orderly statement of 
those principles in which the law consists, whether drawn from the reports 
of law cases, from natural reason, or from any other source.”27 Simpson, 
Plucknett, and Bishop each identified characteristics of treatises that align 
with Judge Edwards’s ideal of legal scholarship that is simultaneously pre-
scriptive and doctrinal, providing instruction to legal decisionmakers while 
focusing on sources of legal authority.28 Others use the term more loosely. 
Fernandez and Dubber include chapters on institutional works, codes, and 
manuals in their recent book, arguing “that these works perform a similar 
                                                                                                                      
 21. Roscoe Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 8–9 (1938). 
 22. Simpson, supra note 15. 
 23. Law Books in Action, supra note 19.  
 24. John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 Colum. 
L. Rev. 547, 586 (1993). 
 25. Simpson, supra note 15, at 633–34. 
 26. T.F.T. Plucknett, Early English Legal Literature 20 (1958). 
 27. Joel Prentiss Bishop, The First Book of the Law: Explaining the Nature, 
Sources, Books, and Practical Applications of Legal Science, and Methods of 
Study and Practice 137 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868). 
 28. Edwards, supra note 2, at 42–43. 
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rationalising and systematising function to the traditional legal treatise.”29 
Standard textbooks on legal research generally lump together a full range of 
books about the law as “treatises” and then identify categories within that 
heading.30 Here, I will concentrate on works fitting the characteristics listed 
by Edwards and fitting the traditional definitions. 
The early development of the common law treatise in England can be 
traced to Thomas Littleton’s Tenures31 in the fifteenth century, with little 
more being achieved in treatise writing until the eighteenth century. Michael 
Lobban notes that in the early part of that century, some “[w]riters did seek 
to write compendious, and systematic treatments on coherent areas of 
law.”32 But changes in English law and improvements in law reporting grad-
ually led to publication of larger numbers of systematic, substantive treatises 
in the late 1700s.33 The publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries from 
1765–1769 gave treatise writers impetus to focus on specific areas of the 
law and “put flesh, as it were, on Blackstone’s bones.”34 Simpson also sug-
gests that Blackstone’s “discursive literary style” was considered a “better 
way to expound the principled science of the law”35 than the lists of maxims 
which had been used to present the principles of the common law since the 
sixteenth century.36 
In North America there was little publication of law books prior to the 
American Revolution. Eldon James found that between 1687 and 1788 “not 
a single book that could be called a treatise intended for the use of profes-
sional lawyers was published in the British Colonies and the American 
States.”37 Pound concluded that, at the time of the Revolution, “[f]or practi-
cal purposes Coke’s Second Institute and Blackstone are the repositories of 
the law.”38 One early commentator noted that in 1800, “the best library of  
                                                                                                                      
 29. Fernandez & Dubber, supra note 19, at 3. They find attempts to define the treatise 
to be “futile and uninteresting.” Id. at 1. 
 30. For an early example, see Frederick C. Hicks, Materials and Methods of 
Legal Research 175–79 (3d ed. 1942). See also Steven M. Barkan et al., Fundamen-
tals of Legal Research 370–72 (9th ed. 2009). 
 31. Thomas Littleton, Littleton’s Tenures (Eugene Wambaugh ed., William S. 
Hein & Co. 2004) (n.d., ca. 1481). 
 32. Michael Lobban, The English Legal Treatise and English Law in the Eighteenth 
Century, 13 Iuris Scripta Historica 69, 74 (1997).  
 33. Id. at 83–84. 
 34. Id. at 69; see also Jon Davies, Aspects of Nineteenth Century Legal Literature, 29 
Cambrian L. Rev. 22, 22–26 (1998) (Wales) (discussing Blackstone’s influence on nine-
teenth-century English treatise writers). 
 35. Simpson, supra note 15, at 658. 
 36. Id. at 644–50. 
 37. Eldon Revare James, A List of Legal Treatises Printed in the British Colonies and 
the American States Before 1801, in Harvard Legal Essays 159, 159 (1934); see also 
Friedman (2005), supra note 16, at 59 (“In one sense, colonial legal literature is quickly dis-
posed of: [there was] [n]o such thing worthy of the name . . . before 1776.”). 
 38. Pound, supra note 21, at 9; see also Hugh C. MacGill & R. Kent Newmyer, Legal 
Education and Legal Thought, 1790–1920, in 2 The Cambridge History of Law in America 
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American reports that could be summoned by money or magic . . . might 
have been borne [in] the circuits in a portfolio.”39 In his classic legal re-
search text, Frederick C. Hicks could identify only sixteen “more important 
volumes” of American reports published from 1789 to 1803.40 Describing 
the conditions of legal practice after the Revolution, Anton-Hermann 
Chroust found that “the absence of American law reports and law books” 
was among several factors making administration of justice in the new coun-
try both “difficult and haphazard.”41 
In the early nineteenth century, however, the remnants of English com-
mon law began to be transformed into a common law for the United States.42 
The first printed reports were significant factors in that transformation be-
cause they gave the legal profession a shared literature, facilitated access to 
out-of-state decisions, and allowed the bar to take seriously the idea of a 
national common law.43 In 1821, Joseph Story characterized the progress of 
jurisprudence in the previous twenty years as “remarkable throughout all 
America” and saw the growth in American reports as evidence of an “un-
common devotion to the study of the law, and uncommon ambition to 
acquire the highest professional character.”44  
There is no doubt that books were important to American lawyers in the 
antebellum years. In an essay on nineteenth-century law books, Ann Fidler 
writes that, no matter the stage of their careers, all lawyers “viewed books as 
absolute necessities crucial to establishing and maintaining a legal practice” 
and were dedicated to building personal law libraries including treatises par-
ticularly.45 Fidler suggests that the treatises “[e]ncapsulated within them . . . 
the vocabulary, the philosophy, and the traditions used by lawyers to distin-
guish themselves from laymen.”46 Yet, she points out that the American 
treatise was “born out of despair” over the “impenetrable vagaries of the 
                                                                                                                      
36, 40 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (arguing that through the Civil 
War “Blackstone remained the starting point [for] legal education and legal thought”). 
 39. Book Review, 22 N. Am. Rev. 27, 29 (1826) (reviewing Reports of Cases, Ar-
gued and Determined in the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine (1824)). 
 40. Hicks, supra note 30, at 135. 
 41. Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Dilemma of the American Lawyer in the Post-
Revolutionary Era, 35 Notre Dame Law 48, 48 (1959). Other factors were the shortage of 
experienced lawyers, public antipathy toward lawyers, and widespread dislike of such English 
institutions as the common law. Id. 
 42. Id. at 73; see also M.H. Hoeflich, Legal Publishing in Antebellum America 
26 (2010) (noting that after 1820, “[T]he development of a native American literature [in law 
as in other subjects] was deemed a national priority”).  
 43. See Chroust, supra note 41, at 75. 
 44. Joseph Story, An Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at Their 
Anniversary, on the Fourth of September, 1821, at Boston, 1 Am. Jurist & L. Mag. 1, 13 
(1829). 
 45. Ann Fidler, “Till You Understand Them in Their Principal Features”: Observations 
on Form and Function in Nineteenth-Century American Law Books, 92 Papers Bibliograph-
ical Soc’y Am. 427, 434–35, 437 (1998); see also Hoeflich, supra note 42, at 4–6. 
 46. Fidler, supra note 45, at 438. 
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common law.”47 Those vagaries were compounded by the growth in pub-
lished case law after the admission of more states to the Union and the 
“growing complexity and quantity of litigation in the wake of the commer-
cial and corporate revolution that began before the Civil War.”48  
Concerns about the growing bulk of cases were not new49 but became 
increasingly common in the United States in the first decades of the 1800s. 
In his address to the Suffolk bar, Justice Story warned of the danger, “not 
that we shall hereafter want able Reports, but that we shall be overwhelmed 
with their number and variety.”50 It was “impossible not to look without 
some discouragement upon the ponderous volumes, which the next half cen-
tury will add to the groaning shelves of our jurists.”51 Kent noted in his 
Commentaries on American Law that it was hard to gain competent 
knowledge of the law “in consequence of the number of books which beset 
and encumber the path of the student,” and that “[t]he evils resulting from 
an indigestible heap of laws, and legal authorities . . . destroy the certainty 
of the law, and promote litigation, delay, and subtilty [sic].”52 In 1846, David 
Hoffman’s Legal Study complained that “[t]he increase of this portion of our 
legal literature within the last thirty years, has no parallel in the juridical 
history of any other country. More than four hundred and fifty volumes of 
American law reports now load our shelves!”53 A few years later, a com-
mentator in The American Jurist and Law Magazine feared that “[t]here are 
many young lawyers who find themselves in the dilemma of [Erasmus], 
called upon to select between law-books and clothes.”54  
The early nineteenth-century treatises were published both to document 
the emerging American common law and to respond to the problems posed 
by the growing body of case law. Initially, many treatises were either re-
prints of English texts or editions of English works edited for the American 
market.55 With the publication of Justice Story’s first treatise in 1832, how-
ever, original treatises on American law became the “predominant form of 
                                                                                                                      
 47. Id. at 437. 
 48. MacGill & Newmyer, supra note 38, at 43. 
 49. See, e.g., M.H. Hoeflich, The Lawyer as Pragmatic Reader: The History of Legal 
Common-Placing, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 87, 92–93 (2002) (noting that the problem of dealing with 
large amounts of legal sources extends back 2,000 years and is not limited to common law 
systems). 
 50. Story, supra note 44, at 13. 
 51. Id. at 31.  
 52. James Kent, 1 Commentaries on American Law 441–42 (1826). 
 53. David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 657 (Philadelphia, Thomas, Cow-
perthwait & Co. 2d ed. 1846). 
 54. See Critical Notice, 23 Am. Jur. & L. Mag. 243, 244 (1840) (reviewing A Full 
and Arranged Digest of the Cases Decided in the Supreme, Circuit, and District 
Courts of the United States, from the Organization of the Government of the 
United States (1839)). 
 55. See MacGill & Newmyer, supra note 38, at 41–42. 
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legal writing in the nineteenth century.”56 G. Edward White found that trea-
tise writers such as Story and Simon Greenleaf, “[b]y ‘tracing every 
principle to its original foundations . . . ’ were claiming the authority to ar-
ticulate the prevailing rules and doctrines and to formulate the principal 
legal issues of their times.”57 Simpson noted that after the publication of 
Story’s texts, “the treatise tradition was firmly established, and such works 
were produced on an extraordinary scale.”58 The new treatises benefitted 
lawyers wallowing in the growing mass of case law and students enrolled in 
the newly established university law schools. Kent’s Commentaries were 
based on his Columbia lecture notes,59 and the nine treatises for which Story 
is known were published after he joined the Harvard law faculty.60 Pound 
would argue that “text writing by teachers” was “the stabilizing agency of 
change” in the antebellum period.61 He identified twenty-two significant 
pre–Civil War treatises62 and claimed that the best were written by “law 
teachers who had been required to formulate their ideas to the exigencies of 
teaching and submit them to critical hearers.”63 Many of these treatises re-
mained central to legal education continuing into the twentieth century.64  
II. A Multiplicity of Cases  
The number of published American decisions continued to grow rapidly 
throughout the 1800s, especially during the last quarter of the century. Trac-
ing what he termed the “vast” accumulation of American law reports, 
                                                                                                                      
 56. Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early 
Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 Hastings L.J. 739, 745–46 (1985) (citing 
Simpson, supra note 15, at 669–74).  
 57. G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–1835, 
at 108 (abr. ed. 1991). Friedman suggests that “these treatises were written to make money” 
and questions their intellectual contributions. Lawrence M. Friedman, Heart Against Head: 
Perry Miller and the Legal Mind, 77 Yale L.J. 1244, 1250–51, 1254 (1968) (reviewing Perry 
Miller, The Life of the Mind in America, from the Revolution to the Civil War 
(1965)). 
 58. Simpson, supra note 15, at 670. In the 1836 second edition of his course of study 
for law students (aimed also at “the profession generally”), Hoffman noted the publication of 
“many valuable original treatises on various departments of the science.” Hoffman, supra 
note 53, at 657. 
 59. Swygert & Bruce, supra note 56, at 745. 
 60. Story taught at Harvard from 1829 until his death in 1845. His treatises were pub-
lished initially between 1832 and 1845 and generated seventy-five editions by the end of the 
century. See G. Blaine Baker, Story’d Paradigms for the Nineteenth-Century Display of Anglo-
American Legal Doctrine, in Law Books in Action, supra note 19, at 82, 84. 
 61. Pound, supra note 21, at 143. Simpson suggests that because their authors were 
affiliated with law schools, the quality of American treatises was often higher than the quality 
of those written in England. Simpson, supra note 15, at 670–71. 
 62. See Pound, supra note 21, at 140–41. See generally Kate Wallach, The Publication 
of Legal Treatises in America from 1800 to 1830, 45 Law Libr. J. 136, 143–45 (1952) (listing 
treatises, manuals, and form books).  
 63. Pound, supra note 21, at 163.  
 64. Id. at 144. 
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Charles Warren cited counts of 800 volumes in 1848, 3,798 in 1885, and 
8,208 in 1910.65 As the number of decided cases increased after the Civil 
War, official reporters could no longer meet the demand for the latest deci-
sions. In response, private publishers began publishing new decisions more 
quickly in a variety of packages.66 Competing schemes called for either se-
lective publication of cases deemed to be of greatest precedential value or 
comprehensive publication of appellate decisions, usually presented in 
groups of decisions from neighboring states. At one point, lawyers in twenty 
states were served by three separate series of official and commercial re-
ports.67 Willard Hurst observed that the precedent-based, multijurisdictional 
U.S. system “was inherently costly to work with. It required time-taking 
search for authorities. It called for expensive law libraries.”68  
The “multiplicity”69 of cases in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
also challenged the idea that the common law should be seen as a source of 
timeless principles. So-called “case lawyers,” apparently more interested in 
finding precedents directly on point for their immediate problem than in 
understanding the principles behind the decisions, were frequently denigrat-
ed in legal periodicals and at meetings of the bar.70 Because of the rapid 
accumulation of case law, John Dos Passos wrote in 1907 that being a law-
yer now “requires a different kind of intellectual development” than in the 
past and that “the modern advocate’s nose is always to be found in a di-
gest.”71 
The case lawyers of the late nineteenth century not only searched for 
precedents in fat volumes of digests, which grew ever larger with the growth 
in case law, but also employed treatises, which themselves increased in 
number. Friedman suggests that about one thousand treatises were published 
in the United States between 1850 and 1900.72 Many post–Civil War treatis-
es seemed, however, to be of a different order than those that came before. 
For Friedman, the typical treatise of this period was “somewhat drier and 
less imaginative than the best work of the prior generation . . . . [and] tended 
to be humorless, impersonal, less concerned with praise and blame than 
                                                                                                                      
 65. Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar 557 (1911). 
 66. Edward W. Jessen, Official Law Reporting in the United States, in Proceedings of 
the Second International Symposium on Official Law Reporting 28, 33–34 (2004).  
 67. Note, The Lawyer’s Reports, Annotated, 22 Am. L. Rev. 921, 921 (1888). 
 68. James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 308 
(1950). 
 69. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the growth in published case 
law was often referred to as the “multiplicity” or “multiplication” of reports. See, e.g., John B. 
West, Multiplicity of Reports, 2 Law Libr. J. 4 (1909). 
 70. Friedman found that lawyers’ own “hunger for precedent” drove the publication of 
more and more cases with the result that they “simply gave up any attempt to grasp the whole 
of the law or stay abreast of it.” Friedman (2005), supra note 16, at 475.  
 71. John R. Dos Passos, The American Lawyer As He Was—As He Is—As He 
Can Be 13 (1907).  
 72. Friedman (2005), supra note 16, at 477. 
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with bare exposition of law.”73 In 1868, Bishop drew sharp distinctions be-
tween works that met his own strict definition of the treatise form and those 
that were called treatises but merely collected points decided by the courts 
and functioned primarily as digests or indexes.74 In 1889, Justice Samuel 
Miller found that “[m]ost of these modern treatises, as they profess to call 
themselves, are but digests of the decisions of the courts, and though pro-
fessing to be classified and arranged in reference to certain principles 
discussed in the book, they are generally but ill-considered extracts from the 
decisions of the courts.”75 Pound wrote that the law-book business was 
based on the idea that the law was not a principled science, but “a body of 
detailed rules, evidenced by reported cases.”76 
Pound was able to identify only three post–Civil War, nineteenth-century 
treatises to “stand with the great texts of the formative era,” but he also ar-
gued that by this time “our case law had reached maturity” and “for a time 
the need [for] writings such as those of the earlier period had ceased.”77 
Even so, the change from the doctrinally rich early treatises to books that 
were “mere key[s] to the cases” made the post–Civil War period “the nadir 
of American law-book writing.”78 In 1909, James De Witt Andrews told an 
audience of law librarians that, while “text books by masters of the subjects” 
were still the best means to find the law, “one cannot approve of all the great 
flood of so-called text books.”79 Justice Miller commented that “the whole 
field of the law has been explored with great industry by recent writers of 
books, mainly at the instance of law publishers . . . for a compensation, and 
not because the writer is impressed with the value or importance of the sub-
ject that he writes about.”80 
                                                                                                                      
 73. Id. at 478. 
 74. Bishop, supra note 27, at 133. 
 75. Samuel F. Miller, The Use and Value of Authorities, 23 Am. L. Rev. 165, 165–66 
(1889).  
 76. Pound, supra note 21, at 158. The founder of West Publishing Co. made the fol-
lowing observation about the question “What is the law on this point?”: “Is it not the function 
and calling of the law publisher to supply the lawyers with mechanical aids toward answering 
the question in whatever connection it may arise?” A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 Am. L. 
Rev. 396, 400 (1889) (written comments of John B. West). 
 77. Pound, supra note 21, at 141 (listing “Cooley’s Limitations (1868), Dillon on Mu-
nicipal Corporations (1872) and Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (1881–1883)” as the three). 
 78. Id. at 157. Contemporary commentators saw this period as a low point in judicial-
opinion writing as well. See, e.g., Alfred Russell, Avoidable Causes of Delay and Uncertainty 
in Our Courts, 14 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 197, 214 (1891) (describing “opinions filling hundreds of 
pages, encumbered with discussions not demanded by the case, and amounting to treatises, 
drawing too nice distinctions, or laboring to avoid clear distinctions”).  
 79. James De Witt Andrews, The Use of the Law Library, 2 Law Libr. J. 8, 12 (1909). 
Lawrence Friedman characterized Charles Warren’s 1911 list of important texts, which in-
cluded thirty-seven late nineteenth-century treatises, as a reflection of the substantial market 
for practical “lawbooks that lawyers could use.” Friedman (2005), supra note 16, at 477 (cit-
ing Warren, supra note 65, at 551–62). 
 80. Miller, supra note 75, at 165. 
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To Pound, the early twentieth-century works of Wigmore, Williston, and 
Beale represented a revival in treatise writing, which “put the matured nine-
teenth-century law in form to be used in a new era of growth.”81 By the 
1930s, he saw the need for doctrinal writing to organize and shape the law 
to be as great as in the “formative era,” not because “the courts had little to 
go on,” but because they had “too much” and “increasingly less time for 
thorough first-hand work upon the vast mass of available material.”82 He 
foresaw a new generation of great treatises coming from the law schools: 
“[N]o one who has followed the history of American law can doubt that the 
jurists and law writers who are to do this will be law teachers.”83 
Simpson believed that the American treatise tradition culminated in the 
early twentieth-century “ultimate treatises” of Wigmore, Williston, Corbin, 
and Scott.84 The revival Pound forecasted had not occurred.85 He conceded 
that there were still some works being produced that could arguably be 
called treatises, but that they generally fell outside the classic definitions of 
the form.86 He suggested several reasons for the decline, including the exist-
ence of multiple jurisdictions in the United States and the “rising bulk of 
legal material, particularly law reports.”87 Although hardly new concerns, 
they remained significant obstacles: “[H]ow could the systematic writer rec-
oncile his presentation of the law as a coherent set of principles with the 
shambles accumulating in the law libraries?”88 Primarily, Simpson attributed 
the decline of the American treatise-writing tradition to the influence of le-
gal realism, which, because it minimized the importance of doctrine, was 
unlikely to view the law as a principled science.89 Morton Horwitz reached 
similar conclusions, describing a “loss of faith in the possibilities of logical 
consistency of legal doctrine.”90  
                                                                                                                      
 81. Pound, supra note 21, at 165 (discussing Joseph Henry Beale, A Treatise on 
the Conflict of Laws (1916), John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the System of 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1904), and Samuel Williston, The Law of Con-
tracts (1920)). 
 82. Pound, supra note 21, at 164. The 1930s were a period of renewed concern over 
the amount of published law. Pound himself chaired an American Bar Association committee 
charged with examining solutions to the problem. See Richard A. Danner, The ABA, the AALL, 
the AALS, and the “Duplication of Legal Publications”, 104 Law Libr. J. 485, 506–08 
(2012). 
 83. Pound, supra note 21, at 165. 
 84. Simpson, supra note 15, at 674. 
 85. Id. at 676 (“[I]n America, where the common law treatise reached perhaps its ulti-
mate point of development, the genre has by now declined rather markedly from its 
preeminence.”). 
 86. Id. at 678 n.318.  
 87. Id. at 676. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 677–78.  
 90. Horwitz, supra note 15, at 460. 
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III. A Farrago of Information 
The rapid growth of published U.S. case law in the early nineteenth cen-
tury helped inspire early treatise writers to create the works that both Pound 
and Simpson would characterize as high points in the development and in-
fluence of the treatise form.91 The new American treatises educated lawyers 
and law students. By providing statements of principles and references to 
precedents supporting those principles, the treatises helped harried lawyers 
do their work. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, lawyers felt 
overwhelmed by the sheer number of published cases available and became 
seekers of precedents rather than principles, relying on digests to locate cas-
es on point rather than on treatises.92 Many treatises were seen as hack 
work—produced by publishers for commercial gain, not by knowledgeable 
scholars devoted to their subjects.93 Pound suggested that, during this peri-
od, there was perhaps less need for the doctrinal analysis provided by the 
great treatises.94 The first half of the twentieth century saw occasional publi-
cation of major treatises on core subjects; later writers, recognizing the 
complexity of twentieth-century law, contributed works on more highly spe-
cialized topics.95 
Simpson linked the treatise’s “fall” from prominence in the United 
States to the influences of legal realism and the sense that judicial opinions 
were not expressions of a rational set of principles but material to justify 
arguments reached on other grounds.96 As legal information moved from 
print to digital formats in the last quarter of the century, print digests were 
supplanted by the powerful search engines of full-text legal research sys-
tems. For Simpson, it seemed that lawyers now needed no more than ready 
access to the opinions provided by “on-line computer systems such as 
LEXIS and WESTLAW.”97  
Simpson started his 1981 article by articulating his interest in “the close 
relation between the forms of legal literature and lawyers’ ideas of what 
they are doing, and of the appropriate way for jurists to behave.”98 This ap-
proach anticipated the mid-1980s works of Ethan Katsh, Bob Berring, and 
others who undertook serious forays into the ways that both the content and 
the forms of legal information affect how lawyers think and how the law 
                                                                                                                      
 91. See Pound, supra note 21, at 140–41; Simpson, supra note 15, at 669–71. 
 92. Friedman (2005), supra note 16, at 475. 
 93. Miller, supra note 75, at 165–66. 
 94. Pound, supra note 21, at 141. 
 95. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, Cox and Hazen on Corpora-
tions (2d ed. 2003); Paul Marcus, The Entrapment Defense (4th ed. 2009); Patrick J. 
Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls (1978). 
 96. Simpson, supra note 15, at 677–78. 
 97. Id. at 678. 
 98. Id. at 633. It is debatable whether he accomplished his aim of showing “that certain 
literary forms are closely tied to theories about the nature of law itself, and that this is particu-
larly true of the treatise.” Id. 
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develops.99 Katsh focused on lawyers’ increasing use of electronic media, 
noting that their growing reliance on legal research databases not only made 
more cases available but also created a demand both for new cases to be 
available immediately and for access to the rapidly increasing amounts of 
legal and nonlegal information accessible via the internet.100 Berring’s inter-
est in the effects of the new media on legal research led him to examine the 
influences of West’s digest system on nineteenth-century lawyers. As  
lawyers lost faith in abiding legal principles, Berring saw the digest-
classification system as a “conceptual universe” that helped attorneys make 
sense of the law created by the ever-growing amount of published material 
in the late nineteenth century.101 But he also recognized that a tool of the 
print era could not be expected to continue its role in an online legal re-
search environment.102 Katsh and Berring both foresaw a situation that 
Plucknett might have called a “farrago” of legal-information electronic 
sources: costly and free, official and commercial, verified and questionable, 
and defiant of any scheme of arrangement.103 Seeing no obvious replace-
ment for the digest, Berring called out for someone to provide the sort of 
structure to the new environment that Blackstone provided in eighteenth-
century England and the digest provided in nineteenth-century America.104 
Conclusion 
Common law lawyers have always sought relief from the masses of dis-
organized materials with which they have to work. Presumably, Judge 
Edwards saw treatises as the paradigm of practical legal scholarship, not 
because he was fond of multivolume sets of books with pocket-part updates, 
but because knowledgeable treatise writers like Story and Williston had 
helped harried lawyers make sense of the raw materials. Although their 
quality varied, in the nineteenth century and in much of the twentieth, trea-
tises provided context and structure to the flood of published cases. They 
created what Edwards termed “an interpretive framework”: categorizing 
authorities, interpreting authoritative texts within the categories, demonstrat-
ing what the law requires, and highlighting gaps. Today’s lawyers have 
ready access not only to cases and other forms of legal authority, but also to 
                                                                                                                      
 99. See generally Richard A. Danner, Legal Information and the Development of Amer-
ican Law: Writings on the Form and Structure of the Published Law, in Legal Information 
and the Development of American Law 6 (Richard A. Danner & Frank G. Houdek eds., 
2008).  
 100. M. Ethan Katsh, Communications Revolutions and Legal Revolutions: The New 
Media and the Future of Law, 8 Nova L.J. 631, 660 (1984). 
 101. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. App. 
Prac. & Process 305, 311 (2000). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Plucknett described the history of English law as being mostly “a farrago of de-
tailed instances which defied any scheme of arrangement, save perhaps the alphabetical.” 
Plucknett, supra note 26, at 19. 
 104. Berring, supra note 101, at 315–16. 
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masses of other information, legal and law-related, generated each day and 
competing for their attention. Is not the lawyer’s need for context and struc-
ture more urgent now than when the first great treatises were written and 
commentators were worried about how quickly the courts had generated the 
first few hundred published volumes of American reports?  
Fernandez and Dubber’s collection of essays on the historical place of 
the treatise suggests that no one in the twenty-first-century United States 
“feel[s] the need to bury their noses in heavy tomes of treatise learning.”105 
Solutions for information-inundated lawyers and judges are unlikely to be 
found in new print tomes (or even in their digitized equivalents). Where will 
lawyers and judges find new forms of interpretive frameworks? Electronic 
search engines, despite their power and sophistication at aggregating data, 
are less successful at providing structure and context for information106 and 
continue to rely on the research skills of searchers and the knowledge they 
bring to the task.107  
Do we need a new Blackstone? Do we need new writers of grand trea-
tises like Story and Williston? In the twenty-first century, American lawyers 
could benefit most from authoritative works on specialized subjects by 
knowledgeable scholars who are not only able to provide interpretive 
frameworks for tackling new questions but also conversant with the technol-
ogies that lawyers employ for seeking and working with legal information. 
Twenty-first-century Blackstones will be technologically literate legal 
scholars who understand the relationships between form, content, and struc-
ture, and who possess the skills to present legal information in innovative 
ways appropriate to the formats in which information is now published, 
identified, and delivered. 
                                                                                                                      
 105. Fernandez & Dubber, supra note 19, at 20. 
 106. See Tom Foremski, Curation and the Human Web, ZDNet (Nov. 17, 2010, 10:52 
AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/foremski/curation-and-the-human-web/1581 (“[W]e are 
reaching the limits of what can be achieved through algorithms and machines in organizing 
and navigating the Internet [and there is growing need for] ‘curation,’ [defined as] choosing 
and presenting a collection of things related to a specific topic and context.”). 
 107. See generally Susan Nevelow Mart & Jeffrey Luftig, The Case for Curation: The 
Relevance of Digest and Citator Results in Westlaw and Lexis (July 18, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2112574. 
